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tiona! rights must generally meet a forbidding standard of justification. Can
the Court really subject all legislation to
that high standard?
Of course not. So the Court (somewhat erratically) uses a sorting device.
When the government infringes a "fundamental" right, it must meet an onerous standard of justification-the infringement must be "necessary'' to serve
a "compelling state interest." Where the
right is not fundamental, the government need only show that its infringement is "rationally related" to a "legitiSchneider
mate state interest." These terms are
marvelously vague, but they are almost
al liberty, . . . to enter into those con- (in the law's cant) "outcome determinatracts . . . which may seem to him ap- tive." In practice, the government can
propriate." For example, New York rarely show a compelling state interest
sought to protect bakers' lungs by for- and can almost always show a legitimate
bidding their employers to make them state interest.
What makes a right "fundamental"?
work more than sixty hours a week. The
Court thought the statute "an unreason- In Washington v. Glucksberg (the assistable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interfer- ed-suicide case), the Court said that first
ence with the right of the individual to it "carefully'' defines the right. 6 Second,
his personal liberty'' because bakers are it asks whether the right is '"deeply root"equal in intelligence and capacity to ed in this Nation's history and tradition'
men in other trades" and can "assert . .. and 'implicit in the concept of ortheir rights and care for themselves dered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty
without the protecting arm of the state, nor justice would exist if they were sacinterfering with their independence of rificed."'
judgment and of action. They are in no
So is the Abigail Alliance right "funsense wards of the state."4
damental"? The Food, Drug and CosThe second period of substantive due metic Act requires that the FDA approcess began roughly with Roe v. Wade prove new drugs, ordinarily in three
and continues today. 5 The scope of phases. "A Phase I study usually consists
today's clause is cloudy and controver- of twenty to eighty subjects and is 'desial, but on one view it embodies a right signed to determine the metabolism and
to make important intimate decisions, pharmacologic actions of the [new]
like choices about abortion, contracep- drug in humans, the side effects associated with increasing doses, and, if possition, marrying, and raising children.
Both versions of substantive due ble, to gain early evidence on effectiveprocess protect individual autonomy as ness."'? The Abigail Alliance-"an orgacontemporaneously understood. But nization of terminally ill patients and
most law limits someone's autonomy in their supporters"-sought access to desome way. Is most law really made un- velopmental drugs by making the conconstitutional by this expansive inter- stitutional claim we began with.
pretation of the due process clause?
The appeals court (rather skeptically)
Of course not. For one thing, gov- "assume[d] arguendo that the Alliance's
ernment may infringe any constitution- description of its asserted right would
al right with adequate justification. As satisfy Glucksbergs 'careful description'
Justice Holmes famously said, "The requirement." The court then addressed
most stringent protection of free speech the Alliance's "history and tradition'' arwould not protect a man falsely shout- gument. First, it evaluated "the Aling fire in a theater and causing a liance's claim ... that 'common law and
panic." But infringements of constitu- historical American practices have tradi-
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o terminally ill patients have a
constitutional right "to decide,
without FDA interference,
whether to assume the risks of using potentially life-saving investigational drugs
that the FDA has yet to approve for
commercial marketing, but that the
FDA has determined, after Phase I clinical human trials, are safe enough for
further testing"? In Abigail Alliance for

Better Access to Developmental Drugs v.
McClellan, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia said
"no." 1 In Abigail Alliance for Better Access

to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, a panel (three judges) of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit said "yes"
(with one dissent). 2 But when the full
appeals court reconsidered the panel's
decision, it said "no" (with two dissents).3
Where in the Constitution might
such a right be found? If anywhere, in
the fifth amendment's due process
clause: "No person shall be ... deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." This clause might seem
only to impose procedural limits on how
the government may take your life, liberty, or property. Nevertheless, twice in
American history the Supreme Court
has believed that the clause imposes substantive as well as procedural limitsthat the clause limits what government
may do as well as how it may do it.
The first period of "substantive due
process" was the opening decades of the
twentieth century, when the Court announced a person's right "to his personjuly-August 2009
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tionally trusted individual doctors and
their patients with almost complete autonomy to evaluate the efficacy of medical treatments."' The court said that
even if drug efficacy had not historically
been regulated, drug safety had been.
Furthermore, in 1962 the FDCA was
amended "to explicitly require that the
FDA only approve drugs deemed effective," and even before that "at least some
drug regulation ... addressed efficacy."
The court then examined the Alliance's argument that the FDCA is "inconsistent with the way that our legal
tradition treats persons in all other lifethreatening situations. . . . Specifically,
the Alliance argues that three doctrines-(!) the doctrine of necessity; (2)
the tort of intentional interference with
rescue; and (3) the right to self-defense--each support the recognition of
a right to self-preservation." The court
briskly found these (somewhat obscure)
doctrines inapposite. In sum, the right
the Alliance asserted was not "fundamental."
Because the right was not fundamental, the FDA only had to meet the low
standard of justification. No problem:
[P] rior to distribution of a drug
outside of controlled studies, the
Government has a rational basis for
ensuring that there is a scientifically
and medically acceptable level of
knowledge about the risks and benefits of such a drug. We therefore
hold that the FDA's policy of limiting access to investigational drugs is
rationally related to the legitimate
state interest of protecting patients,
including the terminally ill, from
potentially unsafe drugs with unknown therapeutic effects.
The dissent was angry, even (by judicial
standards) nasty. It contended that the
"carefully defined" right was not the one
the court had attributed to the Alliance
but rather the right to attempt to preserve one's own life. The dissent not
only described a history and tradition of
respecting that right; it almost implied
that the "history and tradition" test was
supererogatory because the right had a
basis in the actual words of the Constitution, and indeed in the due process
10

clause itself: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw."
In some ways, the dissent has the better of the argument. It is

medicine--evaluate the FDA's decisions
about new drugs? As Rebecca Dresser
observed in her acute analysis of the
panel's decision, that court's understandmgwas

startling that the oft-limited rights
to marry, to fornicate, to have children, to control the education and
upbringing of children, to perform
varied sexual acts in private, and to
control one's own body even if it results in one's own death or the death
of a fetus have all been deemed fundamental rights covered, although
not always protected, by the Due
Process Clause, but the right to try
to save one's life is left out in the
cold despite its textual anchor in the
right to life.

deficient in several ways. The majority seems to assume that most
drugs that get through phase I testing will eventually be approved because their expected benefits will
outweigh harms. The judges also
seem to assume that phase I testing,
which primarily examines safety,
yields high-quality data on effectiveness. They seem to assume, too,
that data from twenty to eighty
people can supply sufficient evidence for patients and doctors to
make informed decisions about new
agents. 8

Furthermore, preventing patients from
deciding what risks to take is hard to
reconcile with the standard precept that
patients have a right to evaluate medical
risks for themselves.
Yet what should we make of a constitutional test which is so wondrously manipulable? For example, much turns on
how broadly you define your right. The
right of terminally ill people to (possibly) lifesaving drugs that have survived a
phase I trial looks little like the kind of
claim constitutions are written to secure,
while the right to protect one's life goes
to the very reason governments are created. Similarly, a right to commit suicide
crumbles against centuries of the canon
'gainst self-slaughter, but a right to decide when your life is worth living resonates with much that makes us cherish
autonomy. No wonder the Abigail Alliance majority said, "As such rights are
not set forth in the language of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has cautioned against expanding the substantive
rights protected by the Due Process
Clause 'because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered
area are scarce and openended."'
Whatever one thinks of this classic
jurisprudential controversy, one should
be relieved that the dissent lost. Had it
prevailed, courts would have been
launched into work dangerously beyond
their competence. For instance, how can
judges-who have little science and less

This is not to say that the FDA's rules
for approving new drugs are ideal or
even sound. A considerable and forceful
literature criticizes them, and the FDA
itself has proposed changes. 9 But the
best cure for regulatory error is rarely another layer of regulation. Balancing the
risks against the benefits of approving a
new drug quickly is an impossible job. If
the FDA-with its expertise and experience-is getting it wrong, why would
the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia-with neither expertise nor experience nor, for that matter, useful constitutional guidance-do
better?
1. 2004 WL 3777340 (2004).
2. 445 F3d 470 (2006). Both McClellan
and von Eschenbach were sued in their capacity as FDA commissioners.
3. 495 F3d 695 (2007).
4. Lochner v. New York, 198 US 45 (1905).
5. 410 us 113 (1973).
6. 521 us 702 (1997).
7. All quotations are from the third Abigail
Alliance decision unless otherwise identified.
8. R. Dresser, "Investigational Drugs and the
Constitution," Hastings Center Report 36, no. 6
(2006): 9-10.
9. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs
for Treatment Use (FDA Proposed Rule), 71 Fed
Reg 75147 (December 14, 2006).
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